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THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES
MARIET-PAST AND FUTURE
THOMAS A. RUSSO AND WILLIAM K. S. WANG*
I. INTRODUCTION
ITHE securities industry today faces numerous changes that may dra-
matically alter its methods of doing business. The traditional domi-
nance of the New York Stock Exchange' has been challenged by new
markets and new market systems, and to some extent by the determina-
tion of Congress and the SEC to make the securities industry more effi-
cient and more responsive to the needs of the general public. The critical
issues facing the industry concern the fixed commission rate, institutional
membership, non-member access and the utilization of automated report-
ing systems. This article will consider each of these issues and its rela-
tionship to the others. It is a basic premise of this article that no one of
these issues can be studied or solved apart from the others.2
Traditionally there has been a sharp distinction between customers
and members of the stock exchange. The customers would give buy and
sell orders to member firms and would pay a fixed minimum commission
rate for a package of services which included research, custodial service,
"hand-holding," and execution and clearance of orders. The member
firms would either use their own floor-brokers for actual execution of an
order on the exchange floor or would purchase the services of an inde-
pendent floor-broker at the relatively low intra-member rate for floor
brokerage.
When investors were small and weak, it was possible to maintain the
differential between a high public commission rate and a low intra-member
rate for floor brokerage. But the business climate began to change as
institutions came to dominate securities trading. Not only did institu-
* Thomas A. Russo received his M.B.A. from the Cornell Graduate School of Business
and Public Administration and his J.D. from Cornell Law School. Mr. Russo served on
the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1969 to 1971, and is currently
associated with the firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft in New York City. He is a
member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars. William K. S. Wang received his
J.D. from Yale Law School. Mr. Wang is an Assistant Professor at the University of San
Diego School of Law, and is a member of the California Bar.
1. See Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Securities Industry Study Report, H.R. Rep. No. 92-1S19, 92d Cong.,
2d Seas. 85-91 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Securities Industry Study].
2. See Speech by Eugene H. Rotberg, Treasurer of the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, National Institutional Trader Conference, June 10, 1969, at 64
[hereinafter cited as Rotberg Speech].
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tions have more bargaining power, but also many were broker-dealers
themselves or had broker-dealer subsidiaries. The distinction between
customer and exchange member was slowly eroded.
The last decade has witnessed a significant increase in the proportion
of securities trading by institutions.' The growth in institutional share
volume has been accompanied by a large increase in the average size of
institutional orders.4 This growth in institutional trading has greatly in-
creased the profitability of the brokerage industry, especially among
those firms specializing in institutional business. Higher profit margins
for such firms resulted from a commission rate schedule5 which simply
did not recognize the economics of handling large orders. For example,
until recently, the average cost of handling a 1,000-share, a 10,000-share,
and a 100,000-share order of a $40 stock was respectively about 6, 42,
and 377 times greater than the average cost of handling a 100-share
order. Yet the commission that could be charged was, respectively, 10,
100, and 1,000 times the 100-share commission.0
Since institutions were large and sophisticated customers, there was
vigorous competition among brokerage firms for their business. Not
surprisingly, the minimum commission structure began to erode. This
erosion did not take the form of an outright rebate to the customer, since
such rebates were prohibited by the constitution of the New York Stock
Exchange.' Instead, a brokerage firm eager to attract institutional cus-
tomers would charge the full commission for the execution of an order,
and then redistribute part of the commission to another broker desig-
nated by the institutional customer.8 Such redistributions were called
"give-ups" and were of two types. In the case of give-ups by check, the
3. Between 1960 and 1969, on the New York Stock Exchange alone, the estimated share
volume of institutional investors rose from about 360 million shares, or 28 percent of the
1960 total public volume, to almost 2.3 billion shares, more than 50 percent of the 1969 pub-
lic volume. The two largest groups of institutional investors, banks and mutual funds, In-
creased their share of total public volume from 18.3 to 34 percent during this same period.
Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, I-I.R.
Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2167-68 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Institutional In-
vestor Study].
4. Id. at 1537-42.
5. The constitutions of the various stock exchanges fix minimum commissions which
member firms must charge customers for executing security transactions.
6. Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 2171-72; see National Economics Re-
search Associates, Reasonable Public Rates for Brokerage Commissions, vol. 1, ch. III
(1970).
7. "[Commissions] shall be net and free from any rebate, return, discount or allowance
made in any shape or manner, or by any method or arrangement direct or indirect." NYSE
Const. art. XV, § 1, CCH NYSE Guide Ii 1701 (1972).
8. See generally Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Pub-
lic Policy Implications of Investment Company Growth, H.R. Rep. No. 2337, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 162-88 (1966).
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recipient broker-dealer would perform no part in the execution and
clearance of the trade in question but would still receive a portion of the
commission. In the case of a floor give-up, the executing broker would
execute but not confirm the execution. Instead, another broker would be
asked to confirm the transaction, and would receive a clearance commis-
sion, fixed by the stock exchange, far in excess of the actual cost of con-
firming the order.' The fierce competition for institutional business
resulted in give-ups of as much as seventy percent of the NYSE minimum
commissions by the executing broker.10
The SEC was opposed to give-ups for several reasons, one of which
was that these rebates were used by mutual funds mostly to reward those
who pushed fund sales." Rarely was the rebate used to obtain lower
commission rates or to cut down expenses for the benefit of fund share-
holders.'2 In 1968, under pressure from the SEC, the New York Stock
Exchange prohibited customer directed give-ups by adding the following
sentence to its constitution:
No member, member firm or member corporation shall, in consideration of the receipt
of listed business and at the direct or indirect request of a non-member or by direct
or indirect arrangement with a non-member, make any payment or give up any work
or give up all or any part of any commission or other property to which such member,
member firm or member corporation is or will be entitled.13
The NYSE constitution was further amended to adopt a volume discount
in commissions.' 4 The American Stock Exchange and all the regional
stock exchanges also adopted a give-up prohibition and a similar
volume discount. 5 Even after the volume discount, however, the rates
on large orders remained far above the actual cost of execution.
9. Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 2183.
10. Id. at 2184; Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 117-18. Although the New
York Stock Exchange did not permit give-ups to non-members (NYSE Const. art. XV,
§ 8, CCH NYSE Guide ff 1708 (1972)), some of the regional exchanges allowed give-ups
to any member of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), including mutual
fund advisors and mutual fund underwriting subsidiaries. Other regional exchanges only
permitted give-ups between members, but allowed institutions to become members.
ii. "Wrhile it is the mutual funds themselves whose portfolio transactions provide the
brokerage which constitutes the currency of reciprocity, its principal beneficiaries are not
the funds but their investment advisers and principal underwriters." SEC, Special Study
of Securities Market Report, H.IR Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 171 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Special Study].
12. See Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 132 & n.14; Note, Conflict of Interest
in the Allocation of Mutual Fund Brokerage Business, 80 Yale L.J. 372, 380-81 (1970).
13. NYSE Const. art. XV, § 1, CCH NYSE Guide ff 1701 (1972).
14. Id. § 2, CCH NYSE Guide ff 1702.
15. Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 2200. See also Note, Informal Bargaining
Process: An Analysis of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation of the New
York Stock Exchange, 80 Yale L.J. 811 (1971).
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Although give-ups by check had been eliminated, floor give-ups con-
tinued. Furthermore, the nature of large-block trading had changed so
that the minimum commission rate on many extremely large transactions
had become meaningless. Block trades are often too large to be brought
to the floor of an exchange without a prior assembling of orders on the
other side of the transaction. The major brokerage firms which cater to
institutions have block trade assemblers who telephone customers, contact
other brokerage houses, and possibly confer with the exchange specialist
until the other side of the order is assembled. Frequently, it is impossible
to assemble sufficient orders to cover the entire transaction. In such in-
stances, the brokerage firm may "position" part of the block by tem-
porarily taking it into its own account.10
Block trade assemblers suffer average trading losses per block trade
of about one-half of one percent of the amount positioned (excluding
commission equivalents) .17 Block positioning firms are willing to average
a loss on this activity in order to earn commissions on the rest of the
trade. On any block trade in which some or all of the block is positioned,
therefore, there is in fact no minimum commission rate. The brokerage
firm makes an estimate of how much it expects to make on the entire
deal, including a probable trade loss, and then decides at what price it is
willing to purchase part or all of the block for its own account.
Moreover, institutional investors seeking to reduce commission costs
have been forming subsidiaries or affiliates to join regional stock ex-
changes. 8 There, the subsidiary or affiliate can either directly execute the
institution's transactions, or save commissions through complex reciprocal
practices with other member firms."9
The fixed commission system of the NYSE faces a challenge from an-
other front. Securities listed on the NYSE are also traded on the "third
market",2" where dealers attempt to purchase and sell shares at better
net prices than those available through members of the Exchange. Mem-
ber firms, however, are in effect prohibited from taking advantage of
third market prices by the rules of the Exchange.2'
16. In addition to "positioning" part of a block which cannot immediately be unloaded,
block positioners frequently make bids or offers for the entire block early in the assembly
process. They will then attempt to unload the shares or cover their short position as quickly
as possible, although the process often takes several weeks.
17. Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 1613-14.
18. See Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 118.
19. See Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 2185-88; text accompanying notes
62-71 infra.
20. That is, the over-the-counter market made by broker-dealers who are not members
of the NYSE.
21. See NYSE Rule 394, CCH NYSE Guide II 2394 (1972); text accompanying notes
75-94 infra.
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The advent of automated trading systems is another phenomenon
likely to revolutionize the structure of the securities industry.? The
NYSE's barriers to a fully competitive securities market are clearly in-
consistent with central quotation systems which would permit investors
to determine immediately where they could obtain the best net price.
Still another development which is changing the environment of the
brokerage community is the new awareness that the Stock Exchange is
not immune from antitrust laws. In the landmark case of Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange,23 the Supreme Court held that the test for resolv-
ing conflicts between antitrust and regulatory statutes is the necessity
of the antitrust exemption. The Court noted that antitrust law "[r]epeal
is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Securities Ex-
change Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."
24
Since Silver, the Justice Department has hinted that it might challenge
the legality of fixed minimum commission rates, limitations on member-
ship, and certain other NYSE rules which restrict competition. The threat
of such action has precipitated SEC proposals, and NYSE acceptance,
of changes in the operation of the market.
The balance of this article will discuss the interrelated problems of
New York Stock Exchange antitrust immunity and the increased institu-
tionalization of securities trading which has resulted in the erosion of the
distinction between customer and exchange member.
II. AcCESS
Until recently a broker-dealer who was not a member of the New
York Stock Exchange was required to pay the full non-member rate if
he transmitted an order to a member firm for execution on the Exchange.
If a non-member broker-dealer received an order from a customer to
purchase 100 shares of a company listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change, and the broker-dealer transmitted this order to a correspondent
22. See text accompanying notes 142-59 infra.
23. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
24. Id. at 357. See generally Securities Industry Study, supra note I, at 155-68.
On August 5, 1971, Mr. William McChesney Martin, Jr., former chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, submitted to the Board of Governors of the NYSE his report on the
securities market. The "Martin Report" argued for exemptions for the Exchange from
the antitrust laws: "The scope of the immunity granted to the exchange should be co-
existent with the scope of the Securities and Exchange Commission's control of the ex-
changes under the Exchange Act, so that no action or omission by a registered national
securities exchange in performing any of its duties of self-regulation under the Exchange
Act which are subject to review by the Securities and Exchange Commission could give rise to
any claim under the anti-trust laws." [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
g 78,184, at 80,564 (Aug. 5, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Martin Report].
1972]
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member firm in New York, the correspondent in the past charged the
non-member firm the full public commission rate. Since competition
forced the non-member firm to charge his customer the public NYSE
commission rate, the non-member would ostensibly make no profit on
the transaction. In practice, however, the correspondent would generally
realize a profit through the "return" of part of the commission by means
of various reciprocal practices. 25 Nevertheless, there was considerable
pressure on the NYSE from non-members and from the SEC to grant
non-member broker-dealers a preferential rate somewhere between the
intra-member rate and the public commission rate. It seemed difficult to
justify a different rate for different broker-dealers simply because one
had paid the cash to purchase an Exchange seat.
The problems of granting preferential rates (access) to non-member
broker-dealers revolve around the fact that most mutual fund manage-
ment companies are broker-dealers registered with the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers26 or have underwriter subsidiaries which are so
registered. Under these circumstances, granting access to non-member
broker-dealers would also mean giving access to a large group of cus-
tomers. Furthermore, instead of asking for the preferential rate for itself,
a mutual fund could route an order through one of its major non-NYSE-
member fund sellers. The fund seller could then send the order to a major
NYSE member firm with a good reputation for executions (a lead broker)
and thereby pocket the difference between the public commission rate and
the preferential access rate. In many respects this arrangement would
be similar to the give-up by check system which was eliminated in 1968.7
On October 3, 1971, the SEC directed that the New York Stock Ex-
change grant 40 percent access to non-member broker-dealers. 8 The
Exchange published its interpretation of this mandate in NYSE Circular
No. 344. According to the Exchange, the 40 percent access provision
should benefit only those non-member broker-dealers who carried their
own accounts, and should be provided only for customers' orders.29
The New York Stock Exchange interpretation meant that third market
makers could not receive the benefit of the access provision where they
transacted business for their own account through member firms. The
25. See In the Matter of the SEC Rate Structure Investigation of National Se-
curities Exchanges 5410-14, SEC File No. 4-144 (May 15, 1969) (testimony of William
Freund, Vice-President and Economist of the NYSE). See also Section IV infra.
26. NASD is a self-regulatory association formed by industry members in 1939 to police
the over-the-counter markets. See Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 82.
27. See text accompanying notes 7-13 supra.
28. Letter from SEC Chairman Casey to NYSE President Haack, Oct. 3, 1971, In
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. fI 78,306 (Oct. 5, 1971).
29. NYSE Educ. Circular No. 344, at 10 (Nov. 17, 1971).
[Vol. 41
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interpretation further limited the access provision to those non-members
who cleared their own accounts. Thus where a non-member had accounts
carried by a member or another non-member, the access provision would
be inapplicable.
This latter limitation on access was appealed to the Commission by
Source Equities, Inc., a small broker-dealer located in New York °
Source claimed that the access provision was never intended to apply only
where a non-member carried its own accounts. Under pressure from the
Commission, the New York Stock Exchange changed its access provision
to accommodate non-members who did not clear their own accounts. The
effect of this action was an unbundling of the clearance function for cer-
tain non-members. 1
The 40 percent access provision did not directly benefit the public in-
vestor in that, under the New York Stock Exchange interpretation, the
non-member was not permitted to charge anything less than a full com-
mission to its customer. However, the access provision did permit non-
members to have "a piece of the action" with respect to fixed rates with-
out going through various reciprocal practices.
III. INSTITUTIONAL MIEMBERSHIP
The most obvious means by which an institution could bypass the
high fixed minimum commission rates was to become a member of the
New York Stock Exchange.32 The Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington
30. Letter from Arthur Anderson, former President of Source Equities, Inc., to SEC,
Jan. 10, 1972.
31. Unbundling is the separate pricing of the variety of services ordinarily covered by
a single commission, including clearance, execution, research, etc. See Securities Industry
Study, supra note 1, at 145; text accompanying notes 72-74 infra.
32. Several large institutions have expressed interest in purchasing NYSE seats. Investors
Diversified Services, which manages the largest complex of mutual funds in the United
States, sells its funds through its own captive sales force. Therefore, it does not need give-
ups to reward large numbers of independent broker-dealer's fund-sellers. Partly for this
reason, and partly out of a sense of duty to the shareholders of its funds, I.D.S. has long
expressed interest in becoming a member of the New York Stock Exchange. See SEC Rate
Structure Investigation Hearings 2463-539 (July 31, 1968) (testimony of Robert Loeffler
et al). In October 1971, Jefferies & Co., a subsidiary of I.D.S., applied for membership on
the NYSE. Upon being refused, Jefferies filed suit against the Exchange on antitrust grounds.
Jefferies & Co. v. NYSE, Inc., Civil No. 71-4542 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 18, 1971).
In January 1971, the Dreyfus Corporation became the first mutual fund organization to
formally apply for membershili on the New York Stock Exchange. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1971, at 53, col. 7. In a press conference in March 1971, Donald S. MacNaughton, chair-
man and chief executive of the Prudential Insurance Company, chided the New York
Stock Exchange for moving too slowly in widening its membership to include institutions
such as Prudential N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1971, at 57, col 7.
Coincidentally, on the same date as Mr. MacNaughton's March 1971 press conference,
1972]
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Stock Exchange (PBW) has been actively recruiting institutional inves-
tors for membership 3 The Pacific Coast Stock Exchange has also per-
mitted membership to subsidiaries of institutional investors, but has been
more restrictive than the PBW.34 The New York and American Stock
Exchanges have not allowed institutions to become members, but many
firms which are already members of these exchanges have started their
own mutual funds and have diversified extensively into money-manage-
ment activities. In short, the NYSE presently permits its members to
expand into the mutual fund business but does not permit mutual fund
management companies to expand into the Exchange broker-dealer busi-
ness.
There seem to be three specific reasons for affiliations between institu-
tional investors and broker-dealers.55 The first, and perhaps most obvious,
is the benefit of reduced brokerage commission costs to the accounts
managed by the institutional investor, often while increasing the income
of the institutional investor itself. By joining an exchange, an investment
advisor gains the benefit of the intra-member floor brokerage rate. He
can then either charge his clients the full public commission and pocket
the difference, or pass all or part of the commission savings to clients.
Many institutions have joined regional exchanges to save commissions
on transactions executed on the regionals and also to receive rebates on
NYSE business. When such an institution gives NYSE business to a
brokerage firm which is a member of both the regional exchange and
the NYSE, the dual-member brokerage firm will often give a floor give-up
to the institution on unrelated regional business. Thus, any institution
with a regional exchange membership in effect has the benefit of nego-
tiated commission rates on the NYSE.
The second reason is the diversification of the business of the institu-
tional investor in the financial area while supplying additional sources
of capital to the broker-dealer. In some instances, a bank, an insurance
company or other corporation may require a brokerage firm mainly be-
cause it wants a profitable subsidiary. There have been instances where
institutions have acquired broker-dealers and these broker-dealers have
continued to do a general broker-dealer business with customers other
than the acquiring institutional investor.
New York State Controller Arthur Levitt announced that he would seek a New York
Stock Exchange seat for the state's $4.5 billion pension fund if the New York Stock Ex-
change did not alter its fixed commission schedule to include negotiated rates. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 3, 1971, at 57, col. 4.
33. See Wall St. J., Aug. 4, 1972, at 5, col. 2; N.Y. Times, July 29, 1972, at 31, col. 6;
id., June 7, 1972, at 59, col. 5.
34. Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 2308.
35. Id. at 2296-300.
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A third benefit of affiliations between institutional investors and broker-
dealers is the investor's ability to make use of the distribution facilities
of an affiliated broker-dealer to sell its services. For example, a mutual
fund might wish to acquire a retail brokerage firm in order to obtain a
"captive" sales force with which to sell its shares.
Of course, an institution might acquire a mutual fund for all of these
reasons. The New York Stock Exchange has been concerned about the
possible loss in commission revenue to existing members in the event
that institutions were to be allowed to purchase seats and obtain the
intra-member commission rate.
On March 26, 1970, after much negotiation with the SEC and dis-
cussion among the Exchange members, the NYSE formally adopted
rules and amendments which permitted member firms to sell stock to
the public 6 In order to prevent institutions from acquiring the stock
of a publicly held member firm, the Exchange adopted a constitutional
amendment which provided:
The primary purpose of [the member] corporation, and of any parent of such corpora-
tion, [must be] the transaction of business as a broker or dealer in securities.. .3
The Exchange also promulgated a rule explaining the provision. The rule
provided, in pertinent part:
A member organization's, or its parent's, "primary purpose" shall be presumed to be
the transaction of business as a broker or dealer in securities, if its gross income (in-
cluding, in the case of a member organization, the gross income of its corporate
affiliates and subsidiaries controlled by the member organization) from [the transaction
of business in securities] and from interest charges imposed with respect to debit
balances in customers' accounts is at least 50% of its total gross income....as
The Exchange argued that this provision was necessary to ensure con-
trol by the Exchange and the SEC of any parties who own a member
firm.39 The Justice Department filed comments with the SEC opposing
the regulations proposed by the NYSE and maintaining that control over
persons in management positions was sufficient to achieve necessary
regulation °
On October 12, 1971, the SEC began hearings concerning the market
structure of the securities industry. One of the topics which received ex-
36. NYSE Const. art. IX, § 7(b), CCH NYSE Guide f 1407 (1972). See NYSE Rules
311-25, CCH NYSE Guide 1111 2311-25 (1972).
37. NYSE Coast. art. IX, § 7(b)(5), CCH NYSE Guide ff 1407 (1972).
38. NYSE Rule 318.12, CCI N YSE Guide ff 2318.13 (1972).
39. See Letter from NYSE President Robert W. Haack to the staff of the SEC, Oct.
1, 1969.
40. Comments of the United States Department of Justice, Inquiry into New York
Stock Exchange Proposals to Permit Public Ownership of Member Corporations, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8717, at 23-24 (Feb. 6, 1970).
1972]
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tensive discussion at those hearings was institutional membership.41 The
Commission released its findings at the conclusion of the hearings on
February 2, 1972, in a sixty-four page report entitled Statement of the
Securities Exchange Commission on the Future Structure of the Securi-
ties Market.
The SEC stated in its report "that membership in the central market
system should be open only to those who meet qualifying standards and
who have the primary purpose of serving the public as brokers or market-
makers." 42 The Commission emphasized its belief that large investors
should not, "by virtue of their economic power and size, be entitled to
obtain rebates of commissions not available to other investors.14  So long
as fixed commission rates exist, stated the SEC, they should apply to all
investors without exception. "Institutional membership, however," it
pointed out, "provides a vehicle for obtaining rebates, either directly
or indirectly.' 44
The Commission also noted that institutional membership is often
acquired for private purposes rather than for the purpose of serving the
public in an agency capacity or otherwise performing a useful market
function. The Commission was concerned that the only purpose of insti-
tutional membership for many institutions was to recapture commissions.
The SEC concluded:
The public should have the assurance that a member of an exchange is dedicated to
serving the public, and membership by institutions not predominantly serving non-
affliated customers should not be permitted to cloud this objective.45
The Commission made it clear, however, that the type of institutional
membership it opposed was that of an institution whose affiliate did not
have as its primary purpose service to the general public as a broker-
41. Before beginning these public hearings, the SEC requested that all regional ex-
changes impose a moratorium on new institutional members until the Commission had an
opportunity to study the question. Mr. Elkin Weatherill, President of the Philadelphia-
Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange, would not agree to such a moratorium. Mr.
Weatherill stated, "We felt we were doing the right thing, so we said we would process the
applications we had, but would not solicit new ones." N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1972, § 3, at
2, col. 8.
42. SEC, Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Markets 44 (Feb. 2, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Statement]. Shortly after the SEC's pronouncement, Senator Harri-
son A. Williams, Jr., the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, introduced a
bill which would suspend the SEC's power to bar institutional membership. S. 3347, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Senator Williams' position is that the "primary interest" test of the
SEC is unsound and unfair as long as commission rates remain at artificially high levels.
Address by Senator Williams, Mid-Continental Securities Indus. Ass'n, Chicago, Mar. 11, 1972.
43. SEC Statement, supra note 42, at 46-47.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 48.
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dealer. In the opinion of the SEC, where an institution had an affiliate
which did a vast majority of its business with the public, no major prob-
lems were presented.46 Under the SEC's theory of institutional member-
ship, an affiliated broker-dealer which did 100 percent of its business for
its affiliated institution could merge with another broker-dealer and
would be permitted to remain a member so long as the predominant por-
tion of its business after the merger was "public" in nature.
The primary argument of the Commission was that often institutional
membership is used to rebate commissions, thereby making the fixed
commission rate a negotiated rate. The Commission apparently felt that
if small investors must pay a fixed commission, there was no reason why
large investors, because of their economic power, should pay anything
less. Of course, the Commission had another approach open to it which
would have solved this problem. It could have required negotiated rates
for all. As long as there is a fixed commission rate and as long as broker-
dealers are willing to accept something less than the fixed rate, history
has shown that methods will be devised by which institutions are able to
recapture commissions. The heart of the problem is not institutional mem-
bership, but the fixed rate.
The Commission's second argument against the membership of insti-
tutions whose primary purpose is not to do public business was based
upon the belief that such memberships are obtained only for "private"
purposes, and provide no "useful service to the investing public."4 7 How-
ever, to the extent that the beneficiaries of institutional membership are
the participants' investment companies, pension funds, and the like, it
seems difficult to argue that the nature of their business is purely "pri-
vate. , ,48
It is interesting that the SEC in its February 1972 Statement did not
mention the argument that to permit institutional members would open
the door to "the concentration of economic power."4 Perhaps the reason
for this omission was the SEC's realization that its "primary purpose"
test could encourage institutions to expand to include "public" brokerage
business. The SEC's position could lead to economic concentration in
the securities market0 ° The fact that the Commission disregarded the
46. Commissioner Owens dissented on this point. He noted: "I further believe, however,
and it is here that I disagree with my colleagues, that such affiliated broker-dealer should
be required to do exclusively a public business and should be prohibited from engaging in
any securities transactions with its parent or affiliate." Id. at 61.
47. See Address by SEC Chairman Casey, New York Economic Club, Mar. 8, 1972.
48. Cf. Miller and Carlson, Recapture of Brokerage Commissions by Mutual Funds,
46 N.Y.UJL. Rev. 35, 54 (1971).
49. See Martin Report, supra note 24, at 80,562.
50. For an excellent discussion of the flaws of the "primary purpose" test, see the state-
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New York Stock Exchange's argument that exchanges cannot regulate a
parent or affiliate institution may indicate that the Commission con-
cluded that such control was possible. Thus, a key argument of the NYSE
in favor of its "parent" test5 ' was answered by implication.
On May 26, 1972, the SEC formally requested that the stock exchanges
adopt rules which would permit membership for brokerage affiliates that
did at least 80 percent of their securities business other than for an affili-
ated institution.52 The 80 percent test would exclude from membership
organizations whose primary function was to recapture or rebate com-
missions, or to execute transactions for affiliated persons or organizations.
The House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, in its August 23,
1972 Securities Industry Study Report went even further than the SEC
on the issue of membership for broker-dealers affiliated with institu-
tions. The Subcommittee recommended that "[c]apital and competency
should be the exclusive criteria for determining eligibility for exchange
membership."53 However, it further recommended "[t]hat there should
be a statutory prohibition against any broker-dealer engaging in broker-
age transactions for its affiliated accounts .... M4
The Subcommittee's proposal would open membership to any other-
wise qualified institutionally affiliated broker-dealer, but would preclude
them from handling any brokerage business for the institution. Accord-
ing to the Subcommittee, current exchange members would be subject to
the same restrictions. 5
The SEC's 80 percent test was specifically rejected by the Subcom-
mittee:
While at first blush this proposal appears to be a step along the path to the Subcom-
mittee's recommendation of a flat prohibition, on closer analysis it appears that the
Commission's proposal will cause more harm than good.50
The Subcommittee said that it agreed with the Justice Department's
belief that the proposed percentage test would result in an undesirable
wave of mergers between institutional investors and leading brokerage
merts of I.D.S., Inc. and Jefferies & Co. before the SEC Public Investigatory Hearing on the
Structure of the Securities Markets SEC File No. 4-147 (Oct. 19, 1971).
51. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
52. See Letter from SEC Chairman Casey to the New York Stock Exchange, May 26,
1972. The SEC gave the exchanges until July 31 to formulate their plans. On July 28, the
SEC said that it was apparent the exchanges would not meet the deadline, and announced
that it would shortly convene an appropriate regulatory proceeding. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 9623 (May 30, 1972).
53. Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 148.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 151.
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firms that are already exchange members.57 The Subcommittee also
pointed out that the 80-20 test could have an adverse impact on regional
brokerage firms, because it would force institutionally-affiliated broker-
dealers to try to attract the customers of regional firms in order to meet
their non-affiliated brokerage test. s The "devilish" bookkeeping prob-
lems, and the unwarranted turn-over in customers' accounts which could
result from a firm's need to increase its non-affiliated business were two
more reasons for the Subcommittee's opposition to the SEC's percentage
test.5 9
The institutional membership controversy raises the question whether
there is an inherent conflict of interest between money management and
the brokerage business.6" Will a brokerage firm owned by an institution
favor the institution over its public clients? Will it use its "customers'
men" to push securities which the institutional parent is selling or has
already bought? The Exchange is somewhat reluctant to raise this ques-
tion, since its members already are heavily involved in money manage-
ment, and some conflict of interest presently exists.
The adoption of negotiated commission rates for transactions above
$300,00061 will ease the pressure for institutional membership, but the
problem will remain until negotiated rates are instituted for all large
trades. If fixed minimum commission rates were abolished entirely, there
would be so little difference between a member and a non-member that
non-member institutions would have much less incentive to join and mem-
ber firms would have little incentive to keep institutions out.
IV. RECIPROCAL PRACTICES
Economic back-scratching seems to be a way of life for American busi-
ness. The securities industry is clearly no exception. Because the fixed
public commission rate is excessive, brokerage firms compete for business
by doing favors for their customers. One important favor is reciprocal
business.
In the past, a regional-only member had to pay the full public NYSE
commission rate when it executed an order on the Exchange. It would
57. Id. at 151-52.
58. Id. at 152.
59. Id. The Subcommittee expressed an awareness that "sweetheart deals" could result
from both its own proposal and that of the SEC. That is, "two or more broker-dealers
may work out arrangements wherein each agrees to channel to another the brokerage busi-
ness of its affiliated accounts if similar business is directed in return." Id. at 152-53. The
Subcommittee could offer no solution for this problem, other than rigorous enforcement by
the SEC.
60. See id. at 148-49.
61. See text accompanying notes 133-40 infra.
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appear that the non-member firm would thus make no profit on a trade
executed for the customer. In fact this was not the case. The regional-
only member would send all its NYSE executions to a dual-member cor-
respondent, which would keep track of the commissions it received from
the regional-only firm and return a prearranged percentage of the com-
missions through floor give-ups on unrelated business on the regional
exchange. In other words, if R. Co. was a member of the Philadelphia-
Baltimore-Washington Stock Exchange but not a member of the New
York Stock Exchange, it could still make a profit on NYSE business.
When it executed an order for a customer on the NYSE it would send
the order to D. Co., a member of both the NYSE and the PBW. Although
R. Co. would pay D. Co. the full public commission rate, D. Co. would
name R. Co. as its clearance agent on some unrelated trades that it was
executing on the PBW Exchange, thereby returning part of the NYSE
commission in the form of PBW clearance commissions. The percentage
of the rebate would be subject to negotiation but would generally be about
50 percent. 2 In short, non-NYSE members, even before the adoption
of the 40 percent access provision,"3 received access if they were mem-
bers of the regional exchanges. Today, any institutional investor-broker-
dealer which is a member of a regional exchange can, in effect, enjoy
negotiated commission rates on all NYSE business.
4
There are other forms of reciprocity between institutional investors
and brokerage firms. SEC's Institutional Investor Study reported that
seven out of forty-six banks studied paid almost 98 percent of their free
commissions to depositors. Often, banks would allocate a specific number
of commission dollars to a brokerage firm for each dollar on deposit.
Commission payments tended to be between 7 and 10 percent of the
collected balances of each broker-dealer. In the summer of 1970 the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department announced that such re-
ciprocal practices violated the antitrust laws, and the banks appear to
have discontinued their more blatant reciprocal procedures."6
This article has already described the use of give-ups to reward broker-
dealers for pushing mutual fund shares." If a mutual fund distributor is
62. E. Rotberg, Competition and the Securities Market 28 (April 20, 1967). In a speech
before the National Investor Trade Conference, Mr. Rotberg brought the house down with
the following joke: "Someone reminded me that when [the President of the Pacific Coast
Stock Exchange] was in Washington on George Washington's birthday, he celebrated by
throwing a dollar across the Potomac. I am told that somebody threw a half-dollar back."
Rotberg Speech, supra note 2, at 69.
63. See text accompanying notes 25-31 supra.
64. See E. Rotberg, Competition and the Securities Markets 28-30 (Apr. 20, 1967),
65. See Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 2278-83.
66. See text accompanying notes 8-15 supra.
[Vol. 41
HeinOnline -- 41 Fordham L. Rev. 14 1972-1973
SECURITIES MARKET
a member of an organized exchange, especially the New York Stock
Exchange, regular commission dollars can be used to reward a broker-
dealer for selling the fund's shares. After the prohibition of give-ups,' 7
NYSE member firms had an advantage over non-members in ability to
receive extra compensation from mutual fund managers; and NYSE
members increased their percentage of mutual fund sales after give-ups
were prohibited. 68
In its February 2, 1972 Statement on the Future of the Securities
Market, the SEC stated that the use of brokerage fees to reward broker-
dealers for selling fund shares must be terminated:
To accomplish this the Commission is sending a letter to the NASD setting forth the
Commission's views and requesting the NASD to direct its members to discontinue the
use of reciprocal portfolio brokerage for the sale of investment company shares.Ga
There are serious problems of interpretation raised by the Commis-
sion's statement on reciprocity. For example, would it violate the Com-
mission's mandate if a mutual fund were to give a substantial amount of
its business to a broker-dealer which sells that fund's shares but is also an
excellent broker in the block market?
In one sense, even the allocation of commission dollars in return for
research can be viewed as a reciprocal practice. However, research has
traditionally been viewed as a legitimate portion of the package of ser-
vices purchased with the commission dollar. The Commission further
observed that under the doctrine of "suitability,"7 payment for research
out of commission dollars was proper. The Commission stated:
It is, therefore, the Commission's premise that broad-based securities research and its
prompt and fair dissemination to large and small investors is indispensible to an
efficient system of securities markets .... Vigorous enforcement of the standards of
suitability discussed above would thus mean that as competitive commission rates are
introduced the basic execution charge which would evolve would include the provision
of research services to the extent necessary to comply with these standards.7 1
67. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
68. Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, at 2283-85. The SEC noted that red-
procity between insurance companies and broker-dealers was casual and not effected on
any systematic basis. The SEC warned, however, that two recent developments could in-
crease broker-dealer insurance company reciprocity: the acquisition or founding of mutual
funds by insurers and the sale of insurance by broker-dealers. Id. at 2285-86.
69. SEC Statement, supra note 42, at 43.
70. Under the Rules of Fair Practice of the NASD (art. III § 2) and the NYSE (Rule
405), broker-dealers have a minimum duty to perform in executing transactions. Failure
to conform to "suitability" requirements could mean disciplinary action against the broker-
dealer.
71. SEC Statement, supra note 42, at 35, 39.
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V. UNBUNDLING
On December 31, 1969 the SEC issued a release which invited com-
ment on a number of questions, the first of which was the following:
Assuming continuation of some prescribed commission rate for such relatively stan-
dardized services as "execution" and "clearance", what additional services if any
should be compensated by a fixed minimum rate?72
The response of the Justice Department was not surprising:
This and succeeding questions seem to assume that a fixed rate for execution and clear-
ance alone might be an appropriate solution to the commission rate question. While the
evidence submitted has not established the need for having even this rate fixed, such
a solution would be preferable to the existing arrangement from the standpoint of
economic policy. It seems probable that costs for execution and clearance are more
standardized than other costs presently included in the fixed rate ....
The disadvantage of such a solution is that it would sacrifice any cost-reducing spur
of competition in the execution and clearance process. However, if "execution" and
"clearance" costs were confined solely to the expense of operating the joint facilities
of the exchange and its clearing house, then there would be little (if any) such adverse
affect.73
The response of the New York Stock Exchange was just as predict-
able:
Any commission schedule with prescribed rates for only a part of the service com-
ponents of a complete trade, with the remainder subject to negotiation, would be
tantamount to negotiated rather than minimum rates. The ability to negotiate part
of the cost of a trade is the ability to negotiate the entire cost. Negotiated rates would
splinter the central market and lead to destructive competition.74
The Exchange made a number of other points, but these were clearly
makeweight contentions subservient to the NYSE's major argument
against negotiated commission rates. These arguments will be discussed
in greater detail in the later section of this article dealing with fixed
versus negotiated commission rates.
VI. RULE 394
Securities Exchange Act Release 8791 contained another extremely
important question relating to restrictions on NYSE members' off-board
trading:
72. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8791, at 1 (Dec. 31, 1969).
73. Brief for Dep't of Justice. In the Matter of the Commission Rate Structure of Reg-
istered National Securities Exchanges, SEC File No. 4-144, at 5-6 (Mar. 20, 1970) (filed
with the SEC in response to SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8791) [hereinafter
cited as Justice Dep't Brief].
74. Memorandum of NYSE, In the Matter of the Commission Rate Structure of Reg-
istered National Securities Exchanges, SEC File No. 4-144, at 3 (Feb. 12, 1970) (filed in
response to SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8791) [hereinafter cited as NYSE
Memorandum].
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Reference is made to Section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act which contemplates
that exchange rules should be "for the protection of investors," to "insure fair dealing
in securities traded in upon such exchange" and to "insure fair administration of such
exchange." Are these standards consistent with exchange imposition of constraints upon
the exercise of the judgment of a member, acting as agent, in determining whether it
may be in his customer's interest to execute a transaction otherwise than on the floor of
the exchange?75
This question refers to NYSE Rule 394(a) which provides: "Except as
otherwise specifically exempted by the Exchange, members and member
organizations must obtain the permission of the Exchange before effect-
ing a transaction in a listed stock off the Exchange, either as principal or
agent." On October 20, 1966, under pressure from the SEC, the NYSE
adopted Rule 394(b) which provided for an exemption if and when a
member firm showed that it had made "a diligent effort to explore the
feasibility of obtaining satisfactory execution of the order on the floor,"
and filed certain detailed information with the floor governor. Rule
394 (b) has received little use, primarily because of the inconvenience and
delay caused by the complexity of its prescribed procedures. During the
SEC Rate Structure Investigation Hearings, Mr. Morris A. Schapiro tes-
tified that, although his firm was the leading non-NYSE firm which made
a market in bank stocks, he had had only one transaction with a member
firm under Rule 394(b) in 1967 and none in 1968.70
Rule 394 is basically an extension of Article XIV, Section 8 of the
NYSE Constitution, which prohibits a member firm from dealing in pub-
lic orders off the Exchange. In 1941, the SEC, in the Multiple Trading
Case, ordered the NYSE to desist from enforcing this policy against the
regional exchanges.77 Thereafter any security listed on the NYSE could
also be traded by Exchange members on any regional exchange. Anoma-
lously, the SEC still permits the NYSE to restrict its members from
trading listed securities off any organized exchange.
The over-the-counter market for NYSE securities is called the third
market, a term coined by the SEC in its 1963 Special Study of the Se-
75. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8791, at 3 (Dec. 31, 1969). Part (b) of
the question continued: "Is it consistent with the above language of Section 19(b) or with
the purpose of the 1936 amendments to the Exchange Act-to 'create a fair field of com-
petition among exchanges and between exchanges as a group and the over-the-counter markets
to allow each type of market to develop in accordance with its natural genius and consis-
tently with the public interest'-to permit the exchanges to require their members in the
handling of agency transactions to give preference (i) to that exchange; or (ii) to exchange
markets generally over non-exchange markets?" Id.
76. SEC Rate Structure Investigation Hearings 3988-89 (Nov. 7, 196S) (testimony of
Morris A. Schapiro). See also Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 126.
77. The Rules of the INYSE, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
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curities Markets.7 8 Notwithstanding Rule 394, the third market is thriv-
ing. In recent years, well-capitalized third market block-traders have
been in active competition with NYSE member block-traders, who are
required to formally execute their orders on the floor of an organized
exchange and to charge the set minimum commission rates. 0
The Justice Department 0 and such third-market firms as M. A. Scha-
piro & Company and Weeden & Company have argued that the Multiple
Trading Case should be extended to the third market. In that decision,
the SEC noted that the reports of the Senate Committee on Banking and
Currency and of the House Commerce Committee accompanying the
amendments to Section 12 (f) of the Exchange Act expressly state that
the amendments represent an endeavor by Congress to:
create a fair field of competition among exchanges and between exchanges as a group
and over-the-counter markets and to allow each type of market to develop in accor-
dance with its natural genius and consistently with the public interest.8 '
Rule 394 appears to limit the ability of the NYSE member firm to
obtain the best execution for his client.8 2 In 1936, in Edison Electric Il-
luminating Co., the SEC stated:
[A] well-governed exchange recognizes limits to its operations as an automatic auction
market .... [It] should . . . recognize and enforce the duty of a broker to get the
best price for his client, even though that price is only obtainable off the floor of the
exchange .... 83
The Justice Department has commented, "NYSE's Rule 394 represents
part of a broader pattern to protect its minimum commission structure
by prohibiting NYSE members from dealing in listed securities off the
Exchange floor .... 84 The third market poses a special threat to the
NYSE, because unlike the regionals, the over-the-counter market has no
fixed minimum commission rates. Indeed, such price fixing is expressly
prohibited by the Maloney Act amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act of 1 9 3 4 .1 It is difficult for Exchange members to price-fix when there
are active competitors outside the cartel who can undercut the fixed
78. See SEC Special Study, supra note 11, pt. 2, at 870-911.
79. See SEC Rate Structure Investigation Hearings 1459-595 (July 18, 1968) (testimony
of Donald Weedon). Of course, when a NYSE member firm positions part or all of a largo
block, there is in effect a negotiated commission rate. See text accompanying notes 16-19
supra.
80. Justice Dep't Brief, supra note 73, at 18.
81. The Rules of the NYSE, 10 S.E.C. 270, 287 n.43 (1941) (emphasis added).
82. See Russo, NASDAQ and Best Execution, Investment Dealers Digest, Feb. 29, 1972,
at 12.
83. 1 S.E.C. 909, 913 (1936).
84. Justice Dep't Brief, supra note 73, at 153.
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15A(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(b)(8) (1970).
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prices. The third market threat is quite real as automation has greatly
increased the efficiency and strength of the over-the-counter markets.
Indeed, there is now some question whether, absent Rule 394, an auto-
mated third market (with negotiated commission rates) might eventually
eclipse the NYSE itself. This extremely important development will be
discussed in greater detail in the section on automation.
The NYSE's memorandum in response to Release No. 8791 was not
very persuasive. For example, the Exchange asserted:
Some critics of Rule 394 have suggested that because it is the duty of a broker to
get the "best execution" for his customer .... Rule 394 should be abolished. However,
application of the broad statutory yardstick of "protection of investors" should focus
not on the interests of a single customer on one side of a single transaction, but on the
execution of all orders of all customers-both buyers and sellers-day in and day
out....
[O]nce the primary central market is splintered, no investor is assured of a "best
execution." 86
Notwithstanding the Exchange's defense of a central market place,
the fact remains that the market for NYSE listed stocks is already
fragmented by trading on the regionals and the third market. Since the
SEC has decided to encourage competition between the regionals and
the NYSE it would seem logical to also encourage additional competition
from the third market. Furthermore, if a dual-member firm is really de-
termined to execute a trade in the third market, he can do so without
getting approval from the NYSE. Eugene H. Rotberg described this pro-
cedure as follows:
[A] sole member of a regional exchange simply is interpositioned between the dual
member and the third market-maker. The sole member asks permission, which is in-
variably given, to sell (or buy) off-board to a third market maker. The sole member
profits by purchasing at a price differential from the dual member in a simultaneous
on-board trade. This permits the New York member to avoid sending the order on to
the New York Stock Exchange where it often must pay a correspondent the required
brokerage and dearance fees. Moreover, on the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange, some
third market makers are members of the Exchange. Under these circumstances, New
York members can deal with them on a net basis as co-members without even the
need for interpositioning a sole member.8 7
The use of this procedure has been increasing for reasons that will be
discussed in this article's section on automation. The availability of this
loophole raises the question of whether the entire rule should be re-
scinded.'s
86. NYSE Memorandum, supra note 74, at 43.
87. E. Rotberg, Competition and the Securities Markets 31, Apr. 17, 1967 (unpublished
article).
88. In his Jan. 26, 1972 statement at the hearings on market structure before the
Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
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In 1965 the SEC staff investigated Rule 394. The results of the study
were transmitted to the Exchange, but the SEC refused to release the
report to the public. Two and one half years later, Morris A. Schapiro
was finally able to extricate the summary and conclusions of the study
from the SEC. He promptly published this material in the September
1968 issue of "Bank Stock Quarterly," a magazine published by his
company. The SEC finally released the main body of its staff study on
December 14, 1971. The summary made clear the fact that the staff
investigators concluded that Rule 394 was undesirable:
The purpose and effect of the [rule] is to inhibit competition of the member firm
and non-member dealer with the specialist .... [It] reflected a decision by the Ex-
change that all non-members be required to pay a minimum commission on the
execution of any order to which they were a party ....
Rule 394 is geared to the economic interests of Exchange members .... 89
The report went on to suggest a system which, it said, could give firms
maximum access to all bids without fractionalizing the market:
In our view this can best be accomplished if the New York Stock Exchange were to
return to a principle it formerly recognized and which other exchanges observe today:
a broker executing an order for a customer is not entitled to a second commission from
a party sought out by the broker to fill the other side of the order. In other words, a
broker executing an order for a customer by dealing with a non-member market-maker
would not be required to charge that dealer a commission. The order should still be
brought to the floor (as member crosses now are) so that the beneficial aspects therein
involved would be preserved, such as priority of bids and offers, publicity, regulation,
and the depth; we believe that the quality of executions would be benefitted and the
so-called "third market" would remain as a competitive force in the overall market.
Commerce, Mr. Morris Schapiro explained how Rule 394 works: "There is much talk of
Rule 394, but people don't know what it means to them-in their pocketbooks. The rules
are schemed to get two commissions at the expense of the customer-two fixed commis-
sions.
I witnessed a vivid example of this just the other day. One of our traders received a
call from a prominent NYSE member firm asking what we would pay for 3,000 shares of
a stock listed on the NYSE whose last sale there was 294. Our trader bid 29,Y4 net for
the block. The member firm asked, 'do you mind lowering your bid to 292? We would
then charge you Y4, and cross the block at 29%.' 'Crossing the block' means that the
broker gets two commissions, one from his customer (the seller) and one from us, the
dealer. If Rule 394 did not exist, the broker would get the best execution for its customer
by accepting the net price of 29'A. From this he would deduct his commission, and obtain
a net of 29Y2 for his customer. But because of Rule 394, the NYSE broker-prohibited
from trading on a net basis with a non-member dealer-could only net his customer 29%
since the customer unwittingly must absorb the second commission, a matter of an addi-
tional $750 in the broker's pockets." Hearing on Market Structure Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
89. SEC Staff Report on NYSE Rule 394, reprinted in BNA Sec. Reg. L. Rep. No.
132, at D-l, D-48 (Dec. 22, 1971).
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This approach clearly requires change in the minimum commission rate structure of
the Exchange. 90
The Staff Report considered it the duty of the broker to obtain best
execution. It noted that "[t] he basic rule is that a customer who engages
a broker to execute an order on an exchange confers authority on the
broker to conduct the transaction according to the established rules and
customs of the exchange.9 However, if the rule or usage contradicts an
expressed agreement between the customer and the broker, is unreason-
able, illegal, contrary to public policy or otherwise alters the basic intent
of the brokerage relationship, it is not binding upon the customer."12
Thus, the Staff Report seemed to imply that where a NYSE broker knew
or should have known that it could receive a better price for its customer
elsewhere, Rule 394 could not, without causing a violation of the fidu-
ciary duty of best execution, require the transaction to be executed on
the New York Stock Exchange.
In its February 2, 1972 Statement on the Future of the Securities
Markets, the SEC considered the creation of a central market system.
The Commission stated that in order to achieve a central market system
there must be an "elimination of artificial impediments, created by ex-
change rules or otherwise, to dealing in a best available market."0 3
The Commission said that all qualified broker-dealers must be able
to obtain access to all exchanges. This aspect of the Commission's state-
ment appeared to be aimed directly at the elimination of NYSE Rule 394.
In its Security Industry Study Report, the House Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance also criticized Rule 394, and called for its re-
scission:
In a central market system whose objectives are that customers should receive the
best possible execution of their orders in any market wherever situated and that such
orders be transacted at the lowest possible cost, rule 394 has no justification. Accord-
ingly, the New York Stock Exchange should immediately rescind the rule. If this is
not done the Subcommittee will introduce legislation which will have the effect of
abrogating the rule.94
VII. FIXED VERSus NEGOTIATED COMMISSION RATES
A. Introduction
On April 1, 1968 the Justice Department surprised both the SEC and
the New York Stock Exchange by filing a brief with the Commission 5
90. Id. at D-49.
91. Id. at D-21. "[Tlhe broker's duty to obtain best possible execution for his customer
.is the very essence of the broker's agency duty." Id. D-19.
92. Id. at D-21 (footnote omitted).
93. SEC Statement, supra note 42, at 10.
94. Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 127.
95. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice, Inquiry into Proposals to Modify the Coin-
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arguing that fixed commission rates were neither required nor justified
by the objectives of the Securities Exchange Act and consequently were
a violation of the antitrust laws under Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change.6 Stimulated by this pressure, the SEC called for hearings on the
commission rate structureY In August 1968, the NYSE submitted a re-
ply economic brief to the Justice Department.0 During the next year,
the NYSE99 and the Justice Department'" exchanged even longer
and more forceful economic briefs on the subject of commission rates.
The debate between the NYSE and the Justice Department continued
with the Antitrust Division filing critical comments about Exchange pro-
posals to permit public ownership but prevent institutional member-
ship 101 and with replies by both the Justice Department'02 and the
Exchange'0 " to SEC Release No. 8791.
B. The Exchange's Arguments
In its economic briefs and testimony, the NYSE made a number of
fundamental arguments.
1. The Viability of the Central Auction Market
The first contention of the Exchange was that minimum commissions
are necessary as an incentive for brokerage firms to retain membership
mission Rate Structure of the New York Stock Exchange (April 1, 1967) (filed with the
SEC in response to SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239).
96. 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
97. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968).
98. NYSE, Economic Effects of Negotiated Commission Rates on the Brokerage Indus-
try, the Market for Corporate Securities and the Investing Public (1968) [hereinafter cited
as NYSE Economic Brief, Aug. 19681. In addition, Chairman of the NYSE Board Gustave
L. Levy, President Robert W. Haack, Vice President and Economist William Freund and
other officials of the NYSE testified at length at the SEC hearings. SEC Rate Structure
Investigation Hearings 2540-3002 (Aug. 19-21, 1968). The Justice Department Invited a
number of "economist experts" to present their views as well. These experts were Pro-
fessors Paul Samuelson, William Baumol, Harold Demsetz, Henry Wallrah, and Michael
Mann. Id. at 3523-901.
99. Brief of NYSE, In the Matter of SEC Rate Structure Investigation of National
Securities Exchanges, SEC File No. 4-144 (May 1, 1969) (filed in reply to Memorandum
of the Antitrust Div. of the Dep't of Justice, Jan. 17, 1969) [hereinafter cited as NYSE
Economic Brief, May 19691.
100. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice, In the Matter of Commission Rate Struc-
ture of Registered National Securities Exchanges, SEC File No. 4-144 (Jan. 17, 1969) [here-
inafter cited as Dep't of Justice Memorandum, Jan. 19691.
101. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice, Inquiry into New York Stock Exchange
Proposals to permit Public Ownership of Member Corporations (Feb. 6, 1970) (filed with
the SEC in response to SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8717).
102. Justice Dep't Brief, supra note 73.
103. NYSE Memorandum, supra note 74.
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on the NYSE. With the abolition of minimum commission rates, there
would be such a leakage of trades that the Exchange would become "an
association of floor brokers and specialists." Firms would withdraw as
members and conduct the main part of their business by means of
crosses in their own offices or in the third market. With splintered mar-
kets, the public investor might very well lose on poor executions what
he might save on negotiated commissions. The reduced membership on
the Exchange would also impair the NYSE's self-regulatory function.
The Exchange's fragmentation argument could be rephrased as fol-
lows: Excessive public commission rates give brokerage firms the incen-
tive to join the NYSE both to obtain the lower intra-member rate and
to gain the monopolistic profits derived from the high public commissions
set by the cartel. Once firms are members of the Exchange, they come
under Rule 394 which prevents fragmentation of trading and maintains
the liquidity and depth of the central auction market. In short, one of
the Exchange's principal arguments in support of the fixed minimum
commission rate depends on a belief in the necessity of Rule 394.
Rule 394 can only be justified if it is more efficient to bring all trading
in a security to one geographical location. However, the Central Market
Place is no longer a geographical concept but a communications con-
cept.1
04
Even if Rule 394 were justified, however, fixed minimum rates would
be a highly inefficient way of inducing brokerage firms to come under its
jurisdiction. As Professor Samuelson pointed out in his testimony in the
SEC Rate Structure Hearings, the principal barrier to a broker-dealer's
becoming a member of the Exchange is the high cost of purchasing a seat,
which is due to the artificial scarcity of seats maintained by the NYSE
itself. Professor Samuelson urged that all monopolistic restrictions barring
access to the facilities of the exchange be made illegal.10 5
104. "[Wie believe that because of modern communications and data processing facil-
ities it is possible to preserve geographically separate trading markets while at the same
time tying them together on a national basis. We are also satisfied that the Commission
and other regulatory authorities should endeavor to prevent the evolution of a market
place from being distorted by unnecessary restraint on competition." SEC, Letter of Trans-
mittal, Institutional Investors Study, supra note 3, at XXIII. Professor Paul Samuelson has
also questioned the premise of Rule 394: "[T]he New York Stock Exchange, as it should
operate, is not something which is located on the floor of the Exchange. It is as big as
the American T & T telephone network. The securities markets are one live, interconnected
whole and the important thing is that there be freedom for equitable and efficient com-
petitive forces to operate throughout that network and not that we protect volume or ap-
pearances on one particular domicile of the securities business." SEC Rate Structure
Investigation Hearings 3540-41 (Oct. 30, 1968).
105. Id. at 3536-42.
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Professor Baumol went even further than Professor Samuelson and
commented:
[I]t can also be appropriate to consider making membership on the exchange and
adherence to its rules compulsory for any broker-dealer who trades on it more than
some specified volume. This procedure as a means to preserve the centralized market
and to support self-regulation derives its rationale from the elements of public utility
in the function of the exchange which acts as the near-exclusive purveyor of its service
(trading in listed securities, particularly in small quantities). 100
Both Professor Samuelson's and Professor Baumol's proposals would
increase the number of broker-dealers who were members of the NYSE.
Presumably, these new members would tend to trade listed securities on
the Exchange both because of Rule 394 and because of the availability
of the low intra-member NYSE rate.
A more direct means of increasing the trading of listed securities on
the Exchange would be to introduce negotiated rates. It does not take
much economic expertise to predict that lower rates would result in more
rather than less business for the NYSE. As mentioned earlier, the elimi-
nation of fixed commissions would cause the major differences between
Exchange members and non-members to disappear. The Exchange would
gain back the customers and broker-dealers which presently bring their
business to the regionals or the third market in order to grant or obtain
rebates and lower commissions.
The NYSE's argument is based on the assumption that if it were de-
sirable to bring all securities trading to a central market place, the NYSE
would be that market. This assumption is highly questionable. In 1967
the regional exchanges and the third market together accounted for just
over ten percent of all trading in NYSE listed stocks. By 1970, the
share of the regionals and the third market had just about doubled, with
an estimated 35 to 45 percent of blocks of 10,000 or more shares traded
away from the Exchange."' The third market is an especially serious
threat to the New York Stock Exchange. On February 8, 1971,
NASDAQ, the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotations system, commenced operation. Under this system the bid-ask
quotations of all participating OTC dealers are continuously inserted into
a computer system which instantaneously makes the quotations available
on the desk terminals of subscribers to the system. s08 In many respects
the system is like a securities exchange with competing specialists.
106. Id. at 3639.
107. Address by Robert W. Haack, President of the NYSE, Economic Club of New
York, Nov. 17, 1970. See Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 117.
108. See Wolfson, Rosenblum and Russo, The Securities Markets: An Overview, 16
How. L.J. 791, 821-23 (1971).
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It might be argued that public policy dictates that the NYSE floor
should be abolished and that all trades be brought to NASDAQ rather
than vice versa. This question will be discussed in the section of this
article on automation, but it is interesting to note that the Exchange's
arguments in favor of one efficient central marketplace may eventually
be turned against it.
In summary, the Exchange's argument that minimum commission
rates are necessary to preserve the central auction market fails for sev-
eral reasons. First of all, the NYSE's argument depends on a belief in
the necessity of Rule 394, and it is not clear that the premise on which
Rule 394 is based is correct. Secondly, even if Rule 394 were justified,
fixed minimum rates do not appear to be the most efficient or desirable
means of inducing broker-dealers to join the NYSE. Giving out seats
free or even requiring most broker-dealers to join the Exchange would
be much more effective. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of Rule 394 is
to increase trading on the NYSE, and negotiated rates would result in
more trading for the NYSE, not less. Thirdly, even if it is desirable to
bring all trades in a given security to one "exchange," the NYSE is
probably not the place to which the orders should be brought. Even if it
were decided that all trades in listed securities should be brought to the
NYSE, and that the NYSE were a natural monopoly, it might be neces-
sary to regulate the Exchange itself as a public utility, and the utility
commission would set the fees which the Exchange would charge for the
use of its services; but broker-dealers using the Exchange facilities would
still charge competitively determined commissions for their services to
the general public.10 9
2. Destructive Competition
Although the phrase "destructive competition" is frequently incanted
to justify price-fixing, the New York Stock Exchange has gone to great
pains to buttress its argument that competitive rates will lead to destruc-
tive competition in the securities industry. Its arguments are quite com-
plex.
First of all, the Exchange asserts that the average total cost per trans-
action incurred by a brokerage firm declines at a significant rate as a
firm grows larger, partly because of high fixed costs, and partly because
of economies of scale. Consequently, marginal cost is continuously below
average total cost for a wide range of output. If rates were competitively
set, the Exchange argues, prices would fall to marginal cost, which would
be below average cost, and the firms in the industry would suffer losses.
109. See generally Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Pub-
lic, 22 Stan. L. Rev. 675, 704-05, 711 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Baxter].
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The less diversified and less well capitalized firms would go bankrupt
and an equilibrium state would be reached with a few well-capitalized
diversified firms surviving. Size and diversification rather than efficiency
would be the key to survival. Presumably, the surviving firms would be
profitable, either because they were operating at a level where there were
no longer economies of scale, or because they were tacitly agreeing to
keep their prices at average cost or above. In order to justify their argu-
ments, the NYSE includes in its August 1968 economic brief a fair
amount of quite unpersuasive econometric analysis. 10
In its 1968 and 1969 briefs, the Exchange also attempted to demon-
strate that the brokerage industry was exceptionally prone to destructive
competition due to the erratic nature of the demand for its services."1
110. For example, the Exchange sought to demonstrate, by including as "fixed costs"
such items as clerical salaries, communication costs, occupancy and equipment costs, and
"other expenses," including promotion, licenses, dues, and assessments, that for the year
1966, fixed costs for the average firm constituted 51% of total costs. NYSE Economic Brief,
Aug. 1968, supra note 98, at 64.
As the Justice Department pointed out, it was highly unrealistic for the NYSE to classify
75% of salaries of personnel as fixed costs. When volume or profits have declined In the past,
brokerage firms have not hesitated to lay off employees. The brokerage Industry is pri-
marily a service industry, and it should have lower fixed costs than manufacturing industries
and much lower fixed costs than industries which are traditionally regulated as public utili-
ties. Dep't of Justice Memorandum, Jan. 1969, supra note 100, at 114-15.
In its 1968 economic brief, the NYSE also attempted to derive the average cost curve of
the brokerage industry through two techniques. First of all, the Exchange found an
inverse correlation between the rate of growth of member firms during the period 1965-
66 and the direction in which their average unit costs were changing. In other words,
rapid growth was associated with reductions in average cost. NYSE Economic Brief, Aug.
1968, supra note 98, at 55-58.
But, as Professor Baxter has pointed out, this correlation does not demonstrate that
the brokerage industry has a declining cost curve. The data may simply suggest that ef-
ficient brokerage firms tend to grow. Alternatively, it may indicate that there are some
economies of scale in the brokerage industry and that firms that had not yet fully achieved
significant economies of scale were tending to realize them by growth. Baxter, supra note
103, at 697-98.
In addition, the Exchange ran a regression on total costs of output, which showed that
the long-run average cost curve is negatively sloped over the entire range of outputs
covered by firms in the data base. NYSE Economic Brief, Aug. 1968, supra note 97, at
58-63. Although the NYSE did not bother to calculate the steepness of the slope, Professor
Baxter analyzed the Exchange's data and discovered that costs drop quite sharply for
firms that execute fewer than 200,000 transactions per year, but at larger outputs the rate
of decline was insignificant. Thus, Professor Baxter argues that on the basis of the Ex-
change's own data substantially more than 80 firms w6uld survive the introduction of
negotiated rates, a number far in excess of that necessary for effective competition.
Baxter, supra note 109, at 698-99.
111. "When demand reaches short-run peaks, the industry must have available adequate
capacity to handle the load. This means that excess capacity must be tolerated during
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Perhaps the most devastating blow to the Exchange's argument is the
lack of destructive competition in the over-the-counter market and third
market where rates are negotiated. Also, the bargaining of institutional
traders for give-ups and other rebates in effect results in negotiated com-
mission rates for a large number of customers. Thus, the NYSE in its
defense of the fixed rate commission system was in effect defending a
rate system which was and is to a large extent negotiated. Past experience
has not indicated any tendency toward destructive competition among
brokerage firms catering to institutions, which are in general the most
profitable in the industry. Ironically, when the SEC initially proposed to
eliminate give-ups by check,112 the NYSE defended give-ups.
The Exchange also emphasized the public interest in the financial
solvency of brokerage firms and the possibility that bankruptcies might
result in extensive loss of customer funds or securities held in "street
name.""' At the end of 1970, Congress created the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation" 4 which will insure each customer account up to
$50,000, of which no more than $20,000 can be in cash. The SEC is also
considering strict regulations which would require brokerage firms to
carefully segregate their customers' money and securities from the rest
of the firm's assets. If adopted, these regulations should ensure that
customers will be fully protected in the event of a firm's insolvency.
In summary, although the Exchange pressed its destructive compe-
tition theory with great earnestness, its arguments are not convincing.
periods of low demand and in fact should be actively encouraged... . We are not speaking
here of any commission rate policy designed to foster a permanently redundant excess of
supply. But commission rate fluctuations should not be such as to precipitate a reduction
in capacity during periods of below-average demand." NYSE Economic Brief, May 1969,
supra note 99, at 32.
The Exchange then argued that competitive commissions would approximate short-run,
rather than long-run, marginal cost and that "competition would have the tendency to
eliminate excess capacity at times of declining demand--capacity which must be available
during the subsequent phase of recovery in demand." Id. at 36.
The Exchange's argument rests on the propositions that no queuing can be tolerated
and the cost of excess capacity cannot be recovered through negotiated commirsion rates.
However, queuing does occur and should occur to some extent Even now, on a high
volume day, it may be difficult for a client to reach his broker. With competitive rates,
firms would maintain different degrees of excess capacity and charge appropriately different
commission rates.
Additionally, it is unrealistic to assume that firms will constantly change their rates to
reflect temporary variations in short-run marginal cost. See Baxter, supra note 109, at 702-03.
112. Proposed Rule 10(b)-10, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239, (Jan. 26,
1968).
113. NYSE Economic Brief, Aug. 1968, supra note 98, at 108-13.
114. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (1970).
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Mr. William McChesney Martin, Jr. in his report on the securities
market stated that:
Fully negotiated rates may cause a substantial concentration of the securities busi-
ness in a few large firms. Because of the strategic importance of the securities industry
to the operation of the free enterprise-capitalistic system, control of this industry
cannot be permitted to be concentrated in the hands of a few persons or firms. Such a
concentration of power could not be tolerated even on the grounds of efficiency.
Negotiated rates may not have this effect. They may only serve to eliminate the
inefficient, poorly managed broker-dealers. No one knows the answer to this question,
but an abrupt change to fully-negotiated rates would be prudent at a time when the
industry needs continued earnings to accumulate and attract capital."n
3. Price Discrimination
The NYSE also suggested that minimum commission rates protected
small investors from price discrimination. If rates were negotiated, in-
stitutional investors would use their greater bargaining power to force
rates for large orders down to variable costs. Brokers would be forced
to shift overhead expenses to smaller investors with less bargaining
power. 1 6
To this argument the Justice Department retorted:
It must take a certain amount of fortitude to advance such an argument in the face
of the "monopolistic discrimination" of the present rate system, which . . . requires
the investor to pay substantially more than cost on all but the smaller trades ....
In fact, competition is the great eliminator of price discrimination since, in the long
run, it tends to force prices into line with costs.lt'
Since there are large numbers of firms in the brokerage industry, price
discrimination could not persist because no broker-dealer would handle
a transaction at less than long-run marginal cost, no matter how large
the client, and no customer would have to pay much more than long-run
marginal cost because there would always be a competitive broker ready
to handle his order at marginal cost.
The "price discrimination" argument assumes a certain homogeneity
among broker-dealers. This, of course, is not the case. Therefore, ne-
gotiated rates on all orders should not lead to shifting of overhead ex-
penses to the small investor.
4. Quality of Service
The Exchange also pointed out that negotiated commission rates would
lead to unbundling and argued that it is desirable to tie together in-
115. Martin Report, supra note 24, at 80,563.
116. NYSE Economic Brief, May 1969, supra note 99, at 46-47; Id., Aug. 1968,
supra note 98, at 83-88.
117. Justice Dep't Memorandum, Jan. 1969, supra note 84, at 184.
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formation, research, advice, promotional services, and execution. The
NYSE insists that investment advice and research protects the small
investor in the same way that consumer information protects the con-
sumer. Investors should be allowed to obtain these services free, simply
to encourage them to make more enlightened decisions, not only for their
own protection but for the protection of the stock market and the econ-
omy from rampant speculation. Promotional activities should be encour-
aged to make more Americans aware of the benefits of stock ownership
and also to increase individual participation in securities trading at a
time when liquidity is threatened by increased institutionalization.
These arguments are easily rebutted. Tie-ins inhibit the freedom of
the consumer to choose the mix of services he desires. Furthermore,
competition in the markets for the separate services is inhibited. If com-
mission rates were negotiated and unbundled, research might actually
improve because a thriving and highly competitive market advisory
system might develop.
Consumer protection is not an appropriate analogy, because a pur-
chaser of a product such as an automobile is purchasing an item which
is almost a necessity. Malfunctions in the product may severely incon-
venience him or even endanger his life. An individual who purchases
stock has deliberately chosen to play a game in which there is a danger
of loss and the possibility of gain. It seems reasonable that the investor
or speculator should be free to choose his own advisors in this game or
even to have no advisors at all. Furthermore, the present bundled sys-
tem encourages the stockbroker to exploit the unsophisticated investor.
Because the stockbroker receives a fee for execution and not for research,
he is tempted to encourage the customer to churn his account more fre-
quently than is necessary. The best customer is the speculator who trades
frequently, and registered representatives may well encourage their cus-
tomers to speculate.
In summary, unbundling would be an advantageous rather than a dis-
advantageous result of negotiated commission rates.
In its Statement on the Future of the Securities Market, the SEC ex-
pressed concern about the issue of research as an element of the commis-
sion rate. The Commission stated:
In our opinion, the providing of investment research is a fundamental element of
the brokerage function for which the bona fide expenditures of the beneficiary's funds
is completely appropriate, whether in the form of higher commissions or outright cash
payments ....
Concern has also been expressed that under an unbundled rate system many small in-
vestors would seek to obtain the lowest rates available and would lose the benefit of
basic research now paid for by the minimum commission. In this regard, the Commis-
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sion wishes to emphasize that a broker-dealer will not be relieved of his obligation to
his customer with respect to the 'suitability' of a securities transaction. . . .Unarticu-
lated but implicit in such rules is also the broker's obligation to obtain current basic
information regarding the security and then to make an evaluation as to the suitability
of a recommendation for a particular customer in view of both the information con-
cerning the security and the customer's needs.
Vigorous enforcement of the standards of suitability ...would thus mean that as
competitive commission rates are introduced the basic execution charge which would
evolve would include the provision of research services to the extent necessary to
comply with these standards." 8
The Commission's statement places much emphasis on the need for
research to satisfy the suitability rules. However, the Commission seems
to be saying that when a recommendation is given by registered repre-
sentatives it must be backed by reasonable research. The Commission
goes further to say that where a customer wishes to buy securities and
requests no recommendation from the registered representative, the cus-
tomer is entitled to receive from the registered representative any in-
formation that the broker-dealer has available to it."0 However, the
Commission does not require that where the broker-dealer has no in-
formation on the particular stock, it must do adequate research before
executing the customer's order. This would mean that broker-dealers
may be set up whose only function is to execute the transactions so long
as the customers realize that no research will be forthcoming. This is the
present method of doing business for many block positioners and third
market-makers. It would seem that under a system of negotiated rates
the basic execution charge need not include a provision for research.
5. Summary
None of the Exchange's justifications of fixed commission rates are
valid. The Justice Department's side of the extended NYSE-Justice de-
bate is clearly the more persuasive. Fixed minimum commission rates are
not "necessary to make the Securities and Exchange Act work"'2 0 and
are not desirable from a public policy point of view.
The fixed minimum commission rate has been the source of many of
the problems that are currently plaguing Wall Street. High fixed rates
have led to the whole question of whether institutions have a fiduciary
obligation to join regional exchanges. Fixed rates have been the source
of various reciprocal practices. Fixed commission rates have led to a
fragmentation in the securities market and to the birth of the third mar-
118. SEC Statement, supra note 42, at 37-39.
119. Id.
120. See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
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ket. Fixed rates have made the SEC a rate fixing agency-a role for
which it is ill-suited. In short, fixed rates are not only unnecessary in
making the Exchange Act work but have severely hampered the workings
of an efficient securities market.
C. Practical Coiniderations
1. Unenforceability
Much of the theoretical debate between the NYSE and the Justice
Department had an air of unreality, because the Exchange was defending
an abstraction called the fixed commission rate structure which did not
exist in practice. Reciprocity, floor give-ups, institutional memberships
on regionals, and block-positioning have severely eroded the fixed com-
mission rate structure.
The regional exchanges have been quite willing to act as conduits for
rebates of NYSE commissions. Furthermore, as Professor Baumol has
commented, it is highly questionable if the SEC could effectively stop
reciprocal practices and rebates, even if it wished to do so.' The present
system is inequitable because investors vary in their ability to take ad-
vantage of the loopholes and because the rebates have a tendency to flow
into the wrong hands. Under such circumstances, the so-called fixed
commission rate structure does not seem worth preserving.
2. Difficulties of Rate Regulation
If the NYSE were to continue to set fixed commission rates, the SEC
would be forced to regulate these rates like a public utility commission.
Rate regulation is a difficult task at best, but there are special problems
in the brokerage industry which make rational rate regulation virtually
impossible.
Unlike most regulated industries, the brokerage industry is charac-
terized by a multitude of firms which have great variations in their costs
and their kinds of business. There is no regulatory control over exit, en-
try, and many aspects of a firm's operation. Furthermore, the sources of
income of brokerage firms include such bizarre and difficult to allocate
121. As Professor Baumol commented in the Rate Structure Investigation Hearings:
"Where a large number of suppliers is involved, whatever the nature of the regulations, no
matter how severe the penalties imposed on their violation, ways are inevitably found for
their evasion. . .. I know of no exception to the general principle-attempts to enforce
any artificial price in the presence of a multitude of sellers leads inevitably to a patch-
work of regulations, each designed to fill the holes left by its predecessors.... [W]ith such
sub rosa market arrangements funds tend to flow into the wrong hands. Instead of their
going to those who supply the service or to the consumer, they frequently go into some
other pockets." SEC Rate Structure Hearings 3634 (Oct. 30, 1968).
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items as margin interest, interest on free credit balances, and profits (or
losses) from block positioning.
Brokerage firms are multi-product firms. In addition to NYSE busi-
ness, they engage in regional-exchange business, over-the-counter business,
underwriting, mutual fund distribution, arbitrage, trading, money-man-
agement, and many other activities. It is extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to allocate the costs and capital of a firm among these various
activities. Research costs, for example, help to generate income from
trading, money management, and securities commission business. The
registered representative in a regional office will do NYSE commission
business, regional business, over-the-counter business, new issues, sec-
ondary distributions, and mutual fund sales. Moreover, once expenses
are somehow allocated to NYSE business, they must then be divided into
costs related to the order, the number of trades to execute that order, the
value of the transaction, and other variables, to arrive at the commission
schedule, which gives the fee for securities transactions of various sizes
and value.
After the Justice Department challenged the legality of fixed com-
mission rates in its April 1968 brief, the NYSE hired National Economic
Research Associates to develop a rational cost-related commission
schedule. NERA presented its report in 1970.122 Although NERA con-
scientiously attempted to perform its assignment, it was forced to make
innumerable arbitrary decisions. For example, it appears that no attempt
was made to determine whether or not partners' compensation might be
excessive or might represent a return on capital.123 The classification of
costs as order-related, trade-related, and value-related seemed highly ar-
bitrary. Promotional costs, professional fees, dues and assessments, and
research expenses were all classified as "value-related." Either no expla-
nation or a circular one was offered for this allocation.12 4
The NERA study attempted to arrive at an appropriate rate of return
on capital for the brokerage industry by looking at rates of return for
other industries of comparable risk. On an extremely intuitive basis, the
study decided an after-tax return of 15 percent was appropriate for the
brokerage industry.12 5
The commission schedule finally proposed by NERA increased com-
missions on odd lots and trades of up to 200 shares and cut virtually all
122. NERA, Reasonable Public Rates for Brokerage Commissions (1970) [hereinafter
cited by volume as NERA Report]; see Roth, A Dissenting Opinion on the NERA Report,
The Institutional Investor, June 1970, at 42; Thackray, How NERA Developed a New
Commission Schedule, id., Apr. 1970, at 48.
123. See NERA Report, vol. 1, pt. VI, at 2.
124. See id., pt. IX, at 3-8.
125. See id., pt. VIII.
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other commissions. The commission on 100 shares of $40 stock rose 68
percent, while it fell 30 percent on 1,000 share transactions .'2 Although
the net increases were greater than the cuts and were supposed to add
about half a billion dollars in additional revenue to the industry, the
report was bitterly attacked on all sides. The large institutional firms
whose commissions were about to be cut drastically immediately criticized
the new proposed commission schedule. The press almost unanimously
condemned the increases in commissions on small trades. There were also
Congressional murmurs of disapproval about the increased costs to the
small investor. Although some retail houses were pleased by the proposed
changes, they kept quiet; and some retail firms complained that the in-
creases on small trades were too high and would drive away business. -"
Many members of the investing public, as well as some journalists and
politicians, seemed to want to redistribute income between classes of
investors by lowering rates for one class and raising rates for another
class. The problem, of course, is that the brokerage industry is highly
fragmented with firms specializing in different types of customers. Any
attempt to "tilt" the rate schedule in favor of the small investor would
result in excess profits for the institutional houses and losses for the
retail firms.
After the initial brouhaha, the NERA Report quietly slipped into
oblivion. On June 30, 1970 the NYSE, purporting to use the NTERA Re-
port as a basis, submitted to the SEC a proposed rate schedule. The
NYSE's Costs and Revenues Committee, among other things, (i) limited
to 50% the increase on rates for orders up to $5,000; (ii) limited all rates
to a maximum of $1.00 per share; and (iii) raised the N-ERA suggested
rate on orders over $5,000 to make up for revenue lost by lowering rates
on the smaller orders. The arbitrary alterations by the NYSE to the NERA
proposal demonstrated the impossibility of attempting to devise and im-
pose a reasonable commission rate. Since the NERA Report there has
been no other attempt to rationally devise a set of reasonable cost-related
commission rates for the industry.
3. NYSE President Haack's Speech
In a speech before the Economic Club of New York on November 17,
1970, President Haack of the New York Stock Exchange dramatically
and suddenly announced his support for negotiated commission rates. He
indicated that practical considerations had forced him to reverse his
former position.
126. Id., pt. II (c); vol. 2, Table XI, at 1-14.
127. See Thackray, supra note 122, at 49.
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Concerning fragmentation and reciprocity he stated:
[F]ragmentation has been accelerated by the proliferation of reciprocal practices in
the securities industry today which, in my judgment, are not only threatening the
central marketplace but are tending to undermine the entire moral fabric of a signifi-
cant industry as well.... Bluntly stated, the securities industry, more than any other
industry in America, engages in mazes of blatant gimmickry, all of which have been
disclosed under oath at commission rate hearings. Deals are frequently involved, com-
plicated, and bizarre and do no credit to the donor or beneficiary of the reciprocation.128
I personally think [the industry] might well reconsider fully negotiated commissions
as an ultimate objective. The initial emphasis might be put on larger transactions ....
I have altered my own personal thinking as a result of the commission rate proceedings
of the last two years and the fragmentation of markets that has simultaneously been
increasing....
[I]n view of the increased emphasis that rates be reasonable, there is the concomi-
tant responsibility to set standards by one method or another. . . . I believe the
securities industry is being led down the path of utility-type regulation when it pos-
sesses none of the characteristics of a utility.120
President Haack conceded that fixed rates had perhaps brought about
the same kind of self-destruction that the industry had feared would re-
sult from regulated rates. "I inquire of myself," he said, "as to whether
overly-zealous service-type competition and inept management has not
been fostered by minimum commission rates."' 30 President Haack further
acknowledged that putting an end to the fixed commission system could
help solve the problem of institutional membership, because the incentive
to seek rebates on large commissions would be greatly diminished.l"'
Concerning unbundling, President Haack said that he questioned the
propriety of one commission rate serving all customers without regard
to their individual wishes, needs or requirements for varying degrees of
service.'82
Finally, President Haack stated that the negotiation of rates on re-
gional exchanges and the third market "make a mockery of the fixed
minimum rate concept," and have brought about various reciprocal prac-
tices which mean that some customers pay only a fraction of the fixed
schedule. He continued:
I inquire as to whether the fixed rate concept, providing the basis for reciprocity and
concurrently developing an incentive for institutions to recapture all or part of com-
missions paid, is not the single greatest reason for our market fragmentation. We can
compete in only two areas, namely, service and charges, and I submit that no entity,
128. Address by President Haack, Economic Club of New York, Nov. 17, 1970, at 6.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 9.
131. Id. at 9-10.
132. Id. at 9.
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not even the New York Stock Exchange, can forever ward off competition from a non-
competitive stance so far as pricing is concernec.im
Although Mr. Haack's views were promptly attacked by many leaders
of the financial community, his comments on the "fixed" commission
rate were extremely perceptive. The controversy over the desirability of
negotiated rates still rages within the industry. There are still a great
many leaders of the Wall Street community who refuse to face reality
and still support the fixed commission rate system. The fixed commission
rate system is unenforceable, and even if it were enforceable, it would
be impossible for the SEC to find standards by which to regulate rates
in the industry.
D. Toward Negotiated Commission Rates
The Department of Justice stated in January, 1969 that "the sys-
tem of fixed minimum commissions is not justified or needed 'to make
the Securities Exchange Act work.' " In February, 1971, the SEC
directed that the national securities exchanges eliminate fixed rates "on
portions of orders above a level not higher than $500,000.'"1 The ex-
changes implemented the Commission's order in April, 1971. One year
later, the breakpoint for competitively determined commissions was
dropped to $300,000. When the SEC directed this reduction in its Feb-
ruary, 1972 Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Market,
it announced that it would "continue to observe the experience under
the $300,000 level in considering the timing of subsequent steps."'30
Elements in Congress agree that commission rates should be competi-
tively determined. On February 4, 1972, the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs released its report on the securities
industry, in which it remarked that "the interests of the investing public,
as well as the long-term health of the securities industry itself, require
that stock exchange members be free to set their own commissions on
"1137transactions effected for their customers ....
The Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce released its report on the securities
industry on August 23, 1972. In its report the Subcommittee stated that
133. Id. at 10.
134. Dep't of Justice Memorandum, Jan. 1969, supra note 100, at 13.
135. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9079 (Feb. 11, 1971). In October, 1970,
the SEC had announced its conclusion that "fxed charges for portions of orders in excess
of $100,000 are neither necessary nor appropriate." Id., No. 9007 (Oct. 22, 1970).
136. SEC Statement, supra note 42, at 33.
137. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Securities Industry Study
Report, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (Feb. 4, 1972).
1972]
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"fixed minimum commission rates are not in the public interest"'88 and
recommended "that a competitive commission rate system should be
phased in without excessive delay."' 39 The Subcommittee said that the
competitive system "should apply to all transactions, regardless of
size,' 40 and warned that "if reasonable progress toward the elimination
of fixed minimum rates is not being made, we are prepared to take legis-
lative action to achieve this end.''
VIII. AUTOMATION
Perhaps the greatest threat to the continued existence of the New
York Stock Exchange as presently constituted is automation. In the
past several years a number of different automated securities trading
systems have begun operation. Perhaps the most important of these sys-
tems has been the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation System (NASDAQ).142
On February 8, 1971, the entire over-the-counter market was dra-
138. Securities Industry Study, supra note 1, at 131.
139. Id. at 132, 143-44.
140. Id. at 132, 144-45.
141. Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
142. AutEx, a privately owned system operating since August 1969, is designed to facilitate
block transactions within the context of the existing exchange setup. Only broker-dealers
may use the system to express indications of interest to all other subscribers. The indica-
tions give the size and side of the interest and the broker's name. The other subscribers
may contact the broker-dealer named either directly or through one of their own brokers.
The Block Automation System (BAS) is the New York Stock Exchange's answer to
AutEx and operates in basically the same way.
Instinet, another privately owned system, is also designed to aid block-trading but
differs from the previously described systems in that it performs execution as well as com-
munications and information retrieval. It thereby lets institutional subscribers by-pass
brokers and the exchange entirely. The system began operation on July 31, 1970 and had
30 clients as of April 1971.
All subscribers may enter indications of interest or firm orders into Instinct. The Informa-
tion given (price, stock, number of shares, side of interest) may be broadcast to all or selected
other subscribers, or it may be placed in the "book" maintained by the system. When two
entries in the "book" match, the computer notifies the two parties. To preserve anonymity,
a code is specified for each subscriber making an entry.
If a subscriber is interested in contacting another firm, it can actually negotiate through
the system by teletyping narrative messages or using pre-programmed messages. If the two
parties finally agree on the price and size of the trade, the computer automatically closes
the trade and prints out confirmations. Although Instinct is still relatively small, its radical
approach may herald the beginnings of a sizeable "Fourth Market" in which institutions
trade directly with each other.
The systems described in this footnote are all designed to facilitate the trading of large
blocks.
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matically revolutionized by the introduction of NASDAQ. Virtually
every firm which deals in the over-the-counter market subscribes to the
system. At its inception, NASDAQ supplied quotes on 2,400 leading
OTC stocks, although it has the capacity to handle up to 20,000 stocks.
NASDAQ permits dealers to display their quotes and eliminates the time
consuming need to constantly telephone one another.143
In 1968 the by-laws of the NASD were specifically amended by vote
of the full membership to include listed securities in the proposed
NASDAQ system.'" On October 9, 1970, Ralph Saul, the then President
of the American Stock Exchange, wrote the SEC to seek to prevent the
inclusion of listed stocks on NASDAQ. On October 13, 1970, NYSE
President Haack, a former head of NASD, wrote a similar letter. These
two letters were followed by a third letter from Gordon S. Macklin,
President of the NASD, making a similar request. SEC Chairman Budge
wrote back to Mr. Macklin stating that the Commission would have no
objection if the NASDAQ system did not include listed securities. Presi-
dent Macklin, with the approval of the NASD Executive Committee,
then announced that NASDAQ would not carry listed stocks at its in-
ception.1 45 All six members of the Executive Committee were partners or
officers of NYSE firms, and 16 of the 23 members of the NASD Board of
Governors were representatives of NYSE firms.
143. NASDAQ provides service on three levels. Level I supplies representative, or median,
bid and ask quotations to the desk-top video terminals already on the desks of registered
representatives ("customers' men") in retail branch offices of brokerage firms.
The retail trading firm executing orders for public investors will subscribe to Level I.
A subscribing dealer is able to enter the symbol for a stock and immediately view on his
video screen the offers of the firms making a market in that stock. Next to each quotation
is the symbol of a market-maker.
The Level I subscriber is the market-maker himself, who is the only subscriber per-
mitted to put data into the system. For those securities for which he has qualified as a
market-maker, the Level III subscriber can enter, withdraw, and change bid and ask
quotations, which are instantly made available to other Level II and Level 11 sub-
scribers.
On the basis of the quotations displayed on their video-terminals, retail firms will contact
market-makers by telephone to arrange an execution.
Each Level I subscriber, as a condition of registration as a market-maker, must agree
to report at the end of the trading day the volume of shares he has traded in each of the
securities in which he makes a market. His terminal device is equipped to accept this volume
information. After each market-maker in a security has reported, the computer summarizes
the reports by security and issues them to the news media along with the exact dosing bid
and ask price of each security. During the day the computer also calculates a composite
OTC market index and updates it hourly.
144. NASD By-Laws, art. XVI, CCH NASD Mlanual U 1651-54 (1972).
145. Bank Stock Quarterly, Feb. 1971, at 3-5; id., Dec. 1970, at 7-11.
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In December 1970, Shumate & Company, a small over-the-counter firm
located in Dallas, Texas, filed an antitrust treble damage suit charging
that the NASD, the NYSE member firm of Shearson, Hammill & Co.,
and other NASD members who belonged to national securities exchanges
had conspired, combined and agreed to illegally restrain trade in the
purchase and sale of third market securities by excluding NYSE listed
securities from NASDAQ.140 Third market firms also protested the
NASD Executive Committee decision."1 '
On March 14, 1971, about five weeks after NASDAQ commenced op-
erations, the NASD Board of Governors voted unanimously to conduct
a test-listing of listed securities for a period of 90 to 180 days commenc-
ing April 5, 1971. Thirty-six stocks, 32 from the NYSE and two each
from the Amex and the Midwest, were included in the test. 4 '
On April 5, 1971 the number of NYSE stocks was reduced to 30 and
the number of American Stock Exchange stocks to one; but the test
was implemented. Seven weeks after the beginning of the experiment
NASDAQ trading of listed securities was already putting serious pres-
sure on the Exchange; because for the first time third market quotations
were as accessible as floor quotes. 4 9 One early survey of the thirty Big
Board stocks on NASDAQ showed that third market prices were su-
perior to Exchange prices in about a third of the comparisons, and equal
to floor prices in about one fourth of the cases. A small but growing
number of member firms, including Merrill Lynch, were actively making
comparisons between the Exchange and NASDAQ and using the third
market via regional exchanges when the price was right. In late May
1971, Weeden & Co., the leading third market firm, reported that its
business with member firms had risen ten percent as a result of the new
access to its quotations through NASDAQ.'
Since Weeden & Co. is a member of several regional exchanges, NYSE
member firms that are members of one of these two exchanges can ne-
gotiate a transaction with Weeden & Co. and then cross it on a regional
exchange without being forced to charge Weeden a NYSE commission
and without violating Rule 394. 1
146. Shumate & Co. v. NYSE, Civil No. CA-3-4663 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1971);
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,037 (Apr. 7, 1971).
147. See Bank Stock Quarterly, Feb. 1971, at 8; id., Dec. 1970, at 13-14.
148. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1971, at 55, col. 3.
149. Wall St. J., May 25, 1971, at 7, col. 1.
150. Id.
151. As mentioned in the earlier discussion of Rule 394, even if a third market-maker Is
not a member of a regional, he can still deal with a dual member by interpositlonlng a
[Vol. 41
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If Rule 394 were eliminated, NASDAQ might gradually supplant the
New York Stock Exchange. If it were to survive, the Exchange would
certainly be forced to adopt technological innovations it should have im-
plemented long ago.
A fully automated, and possibly merged, NYSE and American Stock
Exchange with negotiated rates would be almost identical to NASDAQ,
except that the organized exchanges would have only one market-maker
in each security, and these specialists would have certain public respon-
sibilities. If there is more than one market-maker, it becomes impossible
to determine which one has the obligation to dampen market fluctuations.
On the other hand, if there are competing market-makers, regulation
may not be necessary. 112 The large number of market-makers might
maintain a reasonably stable market simply by going against the public
to the extent that they feel this is profitable in the long run. Bid-ask
spreads would remain narrow as each market-maker attempted to give
higher bid and lower ask quotations than his competitors. Furthermore,
both the SEC Special Study Report'm and the Institutional Investor
Study 5" raised questions about the efficacy of NYSE and SEC regulation
of specialists, as opposed to the control induced by competition.
In its transmittal letter accompanying the Institutional Investor Study
the SEC stated:
The participation of competing dealers in the central market will also reduce the
element of monopoly power which has accompanied past efforts to establish a central
market and will make it possible for potential abuses of such monopoly power to be
controlled not only by regulation but to an increasing degree by competition....
In summary, our objective is to see a strong central market system created to which
all investors have access, in which all qualified broker-dealers and existing market in-
stitutions may participate in accordance with their respective capabilities, and which
is controlled not only by appropriate regulation but also by the forces of competition.155
The SEC's Statement on the Future Structure of the Securities Market
addressed itself to competing market-makers. It stated:
The Commission believes that the liquidity needs of individual and institutional in-
vestors can best be provided by policies fostering the development of competition
among dealers who are specialists, market-makers and block positioners. Such com-
petition will mitigate the very difficult problem which now exists of developing and
regional-only member between the dual member and himself. See text accompanying notes
87-88 supra.
152. See Wolfson and Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist, 1971 Rev. of Sec. Reg. 891.
153. See note 11 supra, pt. 2, at 78-161. See also Wolfson and Russo, The Stock Exchange
Specialist: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970 Duke L.J. 707.
154. See note 3 supra.
155. SEC, Letter of Transmittal, Institutional Investor Study, supra note 3, pt. 8, at
XXIV-V.
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enforcing rules designed not only to prevent specialists from abusing their privileged
position, but also to motivate them to perform satisfactorily under widely differing
circumstances and in the light of varying risks and pressures.150
Thus it is clear that the Commission's emphasis is on competition
among market-makers. Such competition is found on NASDAQ and not
on the floor of the NYSE.
The advent of NASDAQ has raised anew the question concerning the
fiduciary obligation of the broker to obtain best execution. In the 1936
Segregation Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, it was
stated that "the relationship between broker and customer is fiduciary
in nature. The legal incidents of that relationship are well-established in
existing law .... [H]e is required to exercise the utmost fidelity and
integrity."' 57 As noted earlier 58 the 1965 Staff Report of the Securities
and Exchange Commission on Rule 394 also placed considerable empha-
sis on this fiduciary duty.
If there was an argument at the time of the 1965 Staff Report on
Rule 394 that the broker had an obligation to check to see if it could
receive a better price for its customer, it seems clear that NASDAQ has
added a new dimension to that conclusion. With the press of a button
on NASDAQ a NYSE broker could find out if a better price could be
received in the third market. In those cases where the third market-
maker is not a member of any regional exchange, Rule 394 would lead
to a violation of the principle of best execution.
The basic intent of the brokerage relationship is that the broker fulfill
his obligation of best execution to the customer. It therefore seems ap-
parent that to the extent rules such as NYSE Rule 394 prevent a broker
from obtaining the best execution for its customer, they are clearly un-
reasonable and against public policy.
In answer to this problem it has been argued that by executing trades
in the third market fragmentation will result. Fragmentation, it is
claimed, defeats the concept of a central market system. The fact is that
real fragmentation results by not checking NASDAQ because a full pic-
ture is not seen.
As more volume leaves the NYSE, the specialist's dealer function of
maintaining continuity with depth becomes increasingly difficult. Al-
156. SEC Statement, supra note 42, at 16; See Wolfson and Russo, Let the Specialist
Compete-Regulation Won't Solve Exchanges' Problems, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1971, § 3, at 14,
col. 3.
157. SEC, Report on the Feasibility and Advisability of the Complete Segregation of the
Functions of Dealer and Broker (1936).
158. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
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though this is unfortunate, it should not be used as justification for
keeping volume on the New York Stock Exchange. Instead, the Exchange
should facilitate market-making competition and, in so doing, achieve
narrower spreads between bid and ask and bring about continuity
with depth in the entire market. Competition will also pressure all market-
makers to assume larger positions.
NASDAQ, together with the third market, has been the single most
powerful threat to the New York Stock Exchange's dominance since its
founding in 1792. Recently, the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Washington
Stock Exchange has requested that its specialists be placed on the
NASDAQ system. If this is done other regional exchanges will, no doubt,
follow. This would be another major step towards the growth and domi-
nance of the NASDAQ system.
There can be little doubt that NASDAQ has caused a basic restruc-
turing of the market. It has set up the mechanism for a truly competitive
central market system where all broker dealers may participate.1
NASDAQ, however, does not have provision for the "book" in which
all public orders may be represented. Once such a book is placed in the
NASDAQ system the system will have the benefits of the auction market
together with the advantages of competitive market-makers.
At present NASDAQ is a communications and information retrieval
system only. In the future it should also be possible for negotiations,
executions, clearance, and confirmations to take place through the sys-
tem. This would mean a truly efficient and competitive securities market.
IX. CONCLUSION
Institutional dominance of securities trading has shifted the balance
of bargaining power to the customers and away from brokerage firms.
Furthermore, the antitrust immunity of the Exchange is being severely
questioned by both the Justice Department and Congress. The SEC has
also become increasingly aware of the benefits competition can bring to
the forming of an efficient securities market.
This article has discussed a number of the monopolistic practices of
the New York Stock Exchange, including limitations on the number of
159. In its August, 1972 Securities Industry Study Report the House Subcommittee on
Commerce and Finance stated: "Although the actual details of developing a consolidated
tape and composite quotation system should be left to the Commission, the overall char-
acteristics of such a system should be delineated by appropriate legislative guidelines. The
duty to make timely reports of transactions within the central market system should be
imposed by statute; the precise contents of such reports and the method of their dis-
semination to the public could be provided by rule or regulation." Securities Industry Study,
supra note 1, at 125.
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"seats," prohibition of institutional membership, Rule 394, and fixed
minimum commission rates.
Many of the problems regarding the structure of the securities in-
dustry are centered around the fixed commission rate. The fixed rate
has led to numerous inefficiencies, to the issue of institutional member-
ship, and the Byzantine reciprocity practices in the industry. The fixed
rate together with other monopolistic practices has subverted the goal
of best execution to the economic self-interest of the New York Stock
Exchange. It shelters inefficiency while at the same time giving the well-
managed firms excess profits.
The New York Stock Exchange has taken every opportunity to fight
competition. It sought to prevent listed securities from being included
on NASDAQ. It has recently refused to have competition in the specialist
function. It has instituted Rule 394 to prevent competition from the third
market. It has, in short, made every attempt to insulate its monopoly
status. Fixed commission rates and other monopolistic practices of the
NYSE endanger the efficiency of the securities market. These practices
are certainly not "necessary to make the exchange work," and should
be declared violations of the antitrust laws.
The sweep of technological innovation may resolve many of these
problems. The New York Stock Exchange, unless it changes its philoso-
phy, could well be replaced by a vigorously competitive computerized
over-the-counter market with negotiated commission rates and virtually
no limitations on membership or access.
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